China’s Quantum Gambit
A Dual Track Approach to Quantum Supremacy
The opening of China’s first dedicated photonic quantum computing plant in Shenzhen is not merely a technical milestone. It is a strategic move in a high-stakes geopolitical game, signalling Beijing’s resolve to dominate the next foundational technology. While the West remains fixated on the qubit count of superconducting chips from Google or IBM, China is executing a sophisticated, state-backed strategy to build an entire quantum ecosystem. This pivot from lab to factory floor reveals a ambition that is less about winning a symbolic race for a single machine, and more about securing long-term economic and strategic autonomy.
The plant is an example of the dual-track approach that attempts to mitigate technological risk. On one track, firms like Origin Quantum pursue superconducting qubits—the mainstream path for general-purpose machines. On the other, this new photonic track, championed by state-linked institutes, prioritises stability and near-term commercialisation. An approach that differentiates China from the West in several key technologies—see The Peak and the Base.
Photonic chips operate at room temperature, making them potential candidates for integration into communication networks or precision sensors. China is not betting on one winner; it is building the supply chain and IP for all possible winners. This industrial pragmatism, fuelled by municipal subsidies and national “quantum hubs” in Hefei and Shanghai, is designed to achieve resilience.
Herein lies the core geopolitical challenge. Quantum computing is not just a faster calculator; it is an existential threat to current cryptographic standards, a potential catalyst for unimagined materials and drugs, and a future battlefield for financial and logistics optimization. By systematising production, China aims to lock in a first-mover advantage in the eventual “quantum utility” era. The goal is to set the technical standards, become the primary supplier of core components, and force global industries into its technological supply chains—a playbook witnessed in solar panels and batteries.
For Western policymakers and businesses, the implication is stark. The contest has shifted from publishing papers to prototyping products. A fragmented, venture-capital-driven model in the West now faces a coordinated, state-sponsored one. The risk is not a sudden “quantum Sputnik moment,” but a slow erosion of technological parity, where China steadily captures the associated manufacturing know-how and talent pipeline.
To keep up, the West’s response must be equally strategic. It requires coordinated public investment not only in basic research, but in pilot production lines and, crucially, market demand. Alliances like the US-EU Trade and Technology Council will need to prioritise quantum supply chains. If the West wants to ensure that the quantum future is shaped by more than one geopolitical vision then the mission is clear. Failing to match China’s industrial scale and strategic patience may allow the West win the occasional sprint, but they will lose the decisive marathon.